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The Winter’s Tale of Corruption: The 2022 FIFA 
World Cup in Qatar, the Impending Shift to Winter, 
and Potential Legal Actions against FIFA 
  
By Kate Youd* 
 
Abstract: Hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament have been 
awarded to Qatar through a process that many alleged was corrupt.  The climate in 
Qatar during the summer, when the tournament is traditionally held, is extremely hot, 
leading many in FIFA to consider potentially moving the tournament to the winter 
months.  This move would have a major financial impact on professional soccer 
leagues in Europe and throughout the world, as well as on broadcasters and business 
partners.  This Comment explores how a legal case could be brought against FIFA for 
its decision to award the tournament to Qatar.  This Comment discusses the judicial 
bodies that could hear the case—FIFA’s internal judicial bodies, the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport, and the Swiss Federal Tribunal—and analyzes how this case 
regarding the 2022 hosting rights would likely proceed in those judicial bodies.  It 
ultimately concludes that given governing rules and precedent there is little likelihood 
that a case against FIFA could be successful.  
 
* J.D., 2015, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Humanities, Brigham Young 
University.  I thank the editors and staff of the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
for their hard work and for their contributions to my Comment. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“The World Cup is going to new lands and I am a happy [p]resident as 
we speak of the development of football,” declared Sepp Blatter, president 
of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), on 
December 2, 2010, after Qatar won the vote of the FIFA Executive 
Committee (Executive Committee) to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022.1  
Few shared Blatter’s joy. 
Since the controversial decision for Qatar to host the tournament, the 
opinions of both fans and those in the footballing community at large have 
mostly been against the decision.  The president of the German football 
association said that the decision is “a burden for all of football.”2  Various 
writers have called the decision “FIFA’s folly,”3 a “farce,”4 and a 
“disaster.”5  Others have said the award “make[s] no sense”6 and “you 
might as well hold the World Cup on Mars.”7  The plan is troubled by more 
than mere unpopularity—allegations of bribery and corruption have 
surfaced repeatedly over the three years since the vote was taken.8 
 
 1 2022 FIFA World Cup Awarded to Qatar, FIFA.COM (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.fifa.com/news 
centre/news/newsid=1344500/index.html.  While the sport is known as soccer in the United States, this 
Comment will refer to it as football to match the terminology from FIFA and from the rest of the world.  
Additionally, the terms “World Cup” and “the tournament” will be used interchangeably to refer to the 
FIFA World Cup.  Further, FIFA is an acronym for the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association, otherwise known in English as the International Federation of Association Football. 
 2 German Bosses Call Qatar World Cup a “Burden”, EUROSPORT (Oct. 26, 2013, 3:44 PM), 
http://au.eurosport.com/football/world-cup/2014/german-soccer-bosses-call-qatar-world-cup-a-burden 
_sto3979271/story.shtml. 
 3 Ben Wyatt, FIFA’s Folly?: What’s Riding on the Qatar Question . . ., CNN (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://worldsport.blogs.cnn.com/2013/10/02/fifas-folly-whats-riding-on-the-qatar-question/. 
 4 A Timeline of the Farce That Has 2022 Qatar World Cup and Summer-Winter Debate, FOX 
SPORTS (Sept. 12, 2013, 4:02 PM), http://www.foxsports.com.au/ football/a-timeline-of-the-farce-that-
has-been-the-awarding-and-changing-of-date-of-2022-qatar-world-cup/story-e6frf423-1226717830805 
#.UjdJrGTXQv4. 
 5 Tony Manfred, 11 Reasons Why the Qatar World Cup Is Going to Be a Disaster, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 27, 2013, 2:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/11-reasons-why-the-qatar-world-cup-will-
be-a-disaster-2013-9. 
 6 Peter Fisher, 2022 World Cup –Qatar, FIFA and Winter Make No Sense, SPORTIGE (Sept. 16, 
2013), http://sportige.com/world-cup-qatar-fifa-and-winter-make-no-sense-2013-09/. 
 7 Dan Jones, Dan Jones: You Might As Well Hold the World Cup on Mars, LONDON EVENING 
STANDARD (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.standard.co.uk/ comment/dan-jones-you-might-as-
well-hold-the-world-cup-on-mars-8858810.html. 
 8 See, e.g., Ryan J. Becker, Note, World Cup 2026 Now Accepting Bribes: A Fundamental Transformation 
of FIFA’s World Cup Bid Process, 13 INT’L SPORTS L.J. 132 (2013); David Conn, World Cup 2022: Only a 
Rerun of Votes by FIFA Will Achieve Credibility, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2013/oct/03/world-cup-2022-fifa-qatar (“This issue is more than 
just seasonal; the vote has no credibility.  It should be rerun according to a new, decent, professional process 
befitting the love people have for the game and its greatest sporting occasion.”); Special Report: Qatar 2022 – 
a Crisis of FIFA’s Own Making, YAHOO! SPORT (Sept. 4, 2013, 8:11 AM), https://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com 
/blogs/pitchside-europe/special-report-qatar-2022-crisis-fifa-own-making-070949964.html (“Remember the 
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The situation worsened when FIFA admitted it was likely that the 
tournament would have to be moved from its traditional June–July timeslot 
to sometime during the winter months due to the extreme summer heat in 
the region.9  This proposed move would have massive effects, both 
logistical and financial, on professional football leagues throughout the 
world.  Shifting the 2022 Qatar World Cup to winter would be financially 
detrimental to professional football leagues and the many businesses that 
depend on them. 
This Comment is organized as follows: Part II explores the 
background leading to the 2022 tournament’s potential shift to winter.  Part 
III discusses the governing laws of world football, including the relevant 
judicial bodies within FIFA as well as those outside of it.  Part IV 
illustrates this process through a hypothetical case brought by a national 
football association against FIFA for the award of the hosting rights to 
Qatar and for the shift to winter. 
While a case could be brought against FIFA in a number of venues, as 
will be illustrated in the hypothetical, this Comment will argue that given 
existing precedent it is unlikely that any of the current legal remedies 
available to national football associations would provide a successful 
solution to prevent either (1) Qatar hosting the tournament or (2) the shift 
of the tournament from summer to winter. 
 
II.  HISTORY 
 
Nations have a strong incentive to bid for hosting rights for the World 
Cup, likely the largest sporting event in the world,10 because “[h]osting 
[this event] can serve as a significant bargaining chip in global politics, 
making the competition amongst bidding countries and cities to host [the 
event] intense.”11  This means that bidding for a World Cup is an extensive 
 
weeks leading to December 2, 2010. Not a day passed by without allegations of murky dealings and 
corruption.”). 
 9 See Qatar World Cup Must Be Moved to Winter, Says FIFA Medical Chief, EUROSPORT, 
http://asia.eurosport.com/football/world-cup/2014/qatar-world-cup-must-be-moved-to-winter-says-fifa-
medical-chief_sto3926095/story.shtml (last updated Sept. 16, 2013, 2:32 PM). 
 10  An estimated one billion viewers watched the 2014 World Cup final between Germany and 
Argentina, breaking previous records.  Alice Philipson, World Cup 2014: BBC Pulls in Four Times as 
Many Viewers as ITV, TELEGRAPH (July 14, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/ 
football/world-cup/10966372/World-Cup-2014-BBC-pulls-in-four-times-as-many-viewers-as-
ITV.html. 
 11  Sean Rassel, The Necessity for National Federations to Stand Up for Themselves, 20 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L L. 797, 798 (2012).  According to Sepp Blatter, “economic interests,” including the possibility of 
large construction contracts for European companies, led political leaders in France and Germany to 
pressure FIFA executives to vote for Qatar for tournament hosts.  World Cup – Blatter Blames France, 
Germany for Qatar Choice, YAHOO! SPORT (Nov. 22, 2013), https://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com/ 
news/football-blatter-blames-france-germany-qatar-choice-174136896—sow.html.  This political and 
economic interest in hosting the tournament led Qatar to spend £26.5 million pounds on their bid for the 
tournament.  All That Oil Money Only Fuels More Doubts over Qatar, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2011, 7:06 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2011/jan/18/qatar-2022-world-cup-fifa. 
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and expensive process.12  It is also a process that depends entirely on the 
will of the Executive Committee, which is not accountable to any person or 
entity for the fairness of its decision.13 
 
A.  Awarding the Cup to Qatar 
 
In December of 2010, FIFA held the vote in Zurich, Switzerland for 
the hosting rights to the 2018 and 2022 World Cup competitions.  For the 
2022 tournament, these countries were the five official candidates: 
Australia, Japan, South Korea, Qatar, and the United States.14  The final 
round of voting between Qatar and the United States ended with fourteen 
votes for Qatar and eight for the United States.15 
Since the vote was taken and even for years before the vote, FIFA has 
been dogged with claims of bribery and corruption.16  The vote for Qatar—
an illogical choice given the weather conditions, human rights violations, 
and lack of existing footballing facilities17— only enhanced these claims.18  
Moreover, the farcical level of corruption in FIFA is well demonstrated in 
the case of Mohammed Bin Hammam, a Qatari member of the Executive 
 
 12  For example, England spent £21 million, including public money from several cities, on their 
failed bid to host the 2018 World Cup, which eventually went to Russia.  Australia spent £28 million on 
their bid for the 2022 tournament and won only one vote.  FA Reveals True Cost of England’s Failed 
2018 World Cup Bid, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/football/ 
2011/oct/10/fa-cost-world-cup-bid. 
 13  Indeed, in a report by an independent governance committee led by professor of criminology 
Mark Pieth, it was stated that “the World Cup bidding process is open to ‘corruption, risk and conflict 
of interest concerns.’”  David Conn, Sepp Blatter and FIFA Facing a Moment of Truth – or Another 
Whitewash, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/football/david-conn-
inside-sport-blog/2012/jan/17/fifa-sepp-blatter. 
 14  The results of the bidding were shared with the public by FIFA on their website.  FIFA World Cup Host 
Announcement Decision, FIFA [hereinafter FIFA World Cup Host Announcement Decision] 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/mencompwc/51/97/81/fs-201_13a_fwc-bidding.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2014). 
 15  Id. 
 16  See, e.g., Becker, supra note 8. 
 17  Terrence McCoy, FIFA: Winner of the World Cup of Corruption?, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/02/fifa-winner-of-the-world-cup-of-
corruption/. 
 18  In January of 2013, the magazine France Football published a 20-page story titled “Qatargate,” 
which claimed, among other allegations, that Michel Platini, the president of the Union of European 
Football Associations (UEFA), was convinced to change his vote to Qatar during a secret lunch with 
then-president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Qatari representatives.  2022 World Cup: ‘Qatargate’, 
MARCA (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.marca.com/2013/01/29/en/football/international_football/135948 
8398.html.  “[T]he Qataris discussed the possibility that they would buy Paris Saint-Germain and create 
a new TV sports channel in France to compete with Canal Plus, a channel that Mr. Sarkozy loathed.”  
John Lichfield, Nicolas Sarkozy ‘Colluded’ to Get Qatar 2022 World Cup, INDEP. (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nicolas-sarkozy-colluded-to-get-qatar-2022-world-
cup-8471758.html. 
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Committee who was removed from his position and banned from 
involvement in the sport for life due to corrupt practices (these practices, 
including bribing football-association members to vote for him for FIFA 
president,19 were in matters separate from Qatar’s World Cup bid).20  Even 
the president of FIFA has admitted to politically motivated collusion during 
the voting process, stating, among other allegations, that the Spanish and 
Qatari delegates agreed to vote for each other in their respective 2018 and 
2022 bids.21  Overall, the problems surrounding FIFA,22 especially during 
the bid and the voting process, have cost the organization credibility and 
raised many questions over the validity of Qatar’s hosting of the 
tournament.23 
This controversy over the 2022 Qatar World Cup has been 
problematic for FIFA’s already less-than-stellar reputation, though FIFA 
has taken some steps to remedy the situation.  FIFA’s ethics investigator is 
beginning a tour in which he will visit each of the nations who placed a bid 
for either the 2018 or 2022 World Cup.24  The main purpose of the 
investigation is, according to FIFA’s ethics investigator Michael Garcia, to 
“determine if there have been, or not, breaches of the Ethics Code by 
football officials.”25 
 
 19  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 20  James Dorsey, FIFA Investigates Qatar’s World Cup Bid, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2013, 
12:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/fifa-qatar-world-cup_b_2555911.html.  The 
case against Bin Hammam will be explored in depth in Part III of this Comment. 
 21  See, e.g., Paul Pelso, FIFA President Sepp Blatter Admits Spanish and Qatar World Cup Bid 
Teams Did Trade Votes, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/ 
football/teams/england/8309934/Fifa-president-Sepp-Blatter-admits-Spanish-and-Qatar-World-Cup-
bid-teams-did-trade-votes.html; see also World Cup – Blatter Blames France, Germany for Qatar 
Choice, supra note 11 (the outcome of the vote for Qatar was pressured by France and Germany). 
 22  These issues are not limited to the bribery and corruption scandals.  Even more significantly, 
serious human rights violations have occurred during the construction of new stadiums in Qatar for the 
tournament.  See, e.g., Global Dispute over Qatar 2022 World Cup Needs Immediate Settlement to Save 
Lives, INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.ituc-csi.org/global-dispute-
over-qatar-2022?lang=en; Robert Booth, Qatar World Cup 2022: 70 Nepalese Workers Die on Building 
Sites, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:46 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/01/qatar-
world-cup-2022-nepalese-die-building-sites.  While this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is 
still noteworthy as yet another example of the serious troubles surrounding the placement of the 2022 
World Cup in Qatar. 
 23  One journalist wrote, “[T]he vote has no credibility. It should be rerun according to a new, 
decent, professional process befitting the love people have for the game and its greatest sporting 
occasion.”  Conn, supra note 8.  Additionally, “Football League Chairman Greg Clarke, who was part 
of England’s 2018 bid delegation three years ago when Qatar won the vote for 2022, said FIFA should 
run the vote again rather than switch the tournament to the winter. ‘It should be like any public tender 
process and if the tender isn’t valid, then have a new one,’ he said.”  Richard Conway, Qatar Faces No 
Threat to Its Right to Host 2022 World Cup, BBC SPORT (Oct. 3, 2013, 8:14 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ sport/0/football/24375821. 
 24  Owen Gibson, FIFA Head of Ethics to Gather World Cup 2018 and 2022 Bid Evidence, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/football/ 2013/oct/01/fifa-ethics-world-cup-
2018-2022-investigation. 
 25  Nick Harris, Garcia Offers Whistleblower Anonymity During Qatar 2022 World Cup 
Investigation, SPORTING INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2013/ 
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However, no matter the results of the investigation, FIFA’s Ethics 
Committee26 will not have the power to remove the 2022 World Cup from 
Qatar.  That power remains solely with the Executive Committee.27  Given 
the fact that Blatter, who has an immense amount of power in FIFA as 
president,28 has repeatedly supported the Qatar vote and insisted that it will 
not be changed,29 it is unlikely that the Executive Committee will choose to 
remove Qatar’s hosting rights regardless of the outcome of the 
 
03/12/garcia-offers-whistleblower-anonymity-during-qatar-2022-world-cup-investigation-120301/.   
At the time this Comment was written, this investigation was still in progress.  However, after the 
Comment was completed, Michael Garcia, FIFA’s ethics investigator, completed his report, which only 
complicated the situation.  Instead of publishing the complete report, FIFA elected to publish a 
significantly shorter summary written by Hans-Joachim Eckert, which stated that there was insufficient 
evidence of corruption during the bidding process to strip Qatar of its tournament hosting rights.  Owen 
Gibson, FIFA Report into Alleged Corruption Clears Qatar to Host 2022 World Cup, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/nov/13/fifa-report-alleged-corruption-qatar-2022-
world-cup.  Garcia attacked this conclusion mere hours after it was released, stating that Eckert’s 
summary contained “numerous materially incomplete and erroneous representations of the facts.”  FIFA 
Report ‘Erroneous,’ Says Lawyer Who Investigated Corruption Claims, BBC (Nov. 13, 2014, 12:23 
PM), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/30037729. Garcia submitted a formal complaint over the 
misconstrual of his report to FIFA’s Appeals Committee.  Owen Gibson, FIFA Appeals Committee to 
Consider Michael Garcia’s Complaint, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
football/2014/nov/13/fifa-appeals-committee-michael-garcia?CMP=twt_gu.  Further issues arose with 
identification of FIFA whistleblowers.  Richard Conway, FIFA Whistleblower Phaedra Al-Majid Fears 
For Her Safety, BBC (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/30122601.  Thus, the 
implications of this situation are complex and will continue to develop in the future. 
 26  The Ethics Committee is charged with ensuring ethical practices, as defined in the FIFA Code of 
Ethics, both within FIFA and within national football associations and other football organizations.  See 
infra Part III.A.  Mr. Garcia is the chairman of the investigatory chamber of the Ethics Committee.  
Ethics Committee, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/judicialbodies/ 
committee=1882034.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 27  FIFA’s Ethics Committee Has ‘No Power’ to Remove World Cup 2022 from Qatar Even If Bribes 
Took Place, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:49 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/world-
cup/10449524/Fifas-ethics-committee-has-no-power-to-remove-World-Cup-2022-from-Qatar-even-if-
bribes-took-place.html.  This remains true despite earlier claims by parties associated with FIFA that 
Qatar might lose the tournament based on the ethics investigator’s findings.  Andrew Warshaw, Scala’s 
Swiss Comments on Qatar 2022 Investigation Were ‘Off-Piste’, INSIDE WORLD FOOTBALL (Nov. 14, 
2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/fifa/13616-scala-s-swiss-comments-on-qatar-
2022-investigation-were-off-piste. 
 28  Blatter’s power within FIFA is essentially unlimited.  He has even been compared 
(hyperbolically, but aptly) to North Korean President Kim Jong-un.  See, e.g., Jack Blanchard, FIFA 
Boss Sepp Blatter Is “Like Kim Jong-un,” Says FA Head Greg Dyke, IRISH MIRROR (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.irishmirror.ie/sport/soccer/soccer-news/fifa-boss-sepp-blatter-like-3896543; Misha Glenny, 
Sepp Blatter: Why Football Deserves Better Than FIFA’s Toxic President, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/22/sepp-blatter-football-deserves-better-world-
cup-brazil. 
 29  “There is no doubt that the World Cup in 2022 will be organised in Qatar and this decision is not 
reversible.”  Blatter: World Cup in Qatar Is Not Reversible, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 9, 2013, 7:16 PM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/blatter-world-cup-qatar-not-reversible-2013119172 
121971208.html. 
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investigation into the ethics of the vote.30 
 
B.  Moving the Tournament to Winter 
 
Since the controversial vote in 2010, more problems have arisen for 
FIFA in planning the 2022 Qatar World Cup.  One of the most significant 
issues is the concern that the summer heat in Qatar will make a traditional 
June–July World Cup impossible.  This issue was apparently considered 
during the voting process and was repeatedly mentioned in the Bid 
Evaluation Report for Qatar.31  However, it was only after the vote was 
taken and Qatar was awarded the tournament that it was decided the heat 
would make a summer competition impossible.  The chairman of FIFA’s 
medical committee, Michel D’Hooghe, advised in September 2013 that a 
summer World Cup in Qatar would be dangerous: “From the medical point 
of view I think it will be better not to play during the hot summer 
months.”32  Even Blatter admitted that awarding a summer World Cup to 
Qatar was “a mistake” as FIFA was fully aware of the extreme heat and 
logistical impossibility of a summer tournament, yet still chose Qatar for a 
summer tournament.33  He recognized the difficulties of moving the 
tournament for club football, but insisted that it was an acceptable sacrifice 
because some southern hemisphere teams have previously been required to 
stop their season for the World Cup.34  With these statements, the shift now 
 
 30  The investigation has been criticized because its ultimate goal is unclear given the oft-stated 
impossibility of actually changing the result of the vote.  Owen Gibson, FIFA Investigator into 2018 
and 2022 World Cup Bids Heads to London, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2013, 1:09 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/oct/01/fifa-investigator-world-cup-20182022?CMP=twt_gu. 
 31  See FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION [FIFA], 2022 FIFA WORLD CUP 
BID EVALUATION REPORT: QATAR 5 (2010), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/ 
tournament/ competition/01/33/74/56/b9qate.pdf.  The Report says the following:   
International standards for health and medical services are likely to be met. However, the 
fact that the competition is planned in June/July, the two hottest months of the year in this 
region, has to be considered as a potential health risk for players, officials, the FIFA 
family and spectators, and requires precautions to be taken. 
Id.  The report mentions that “Qatar is developing hi-tech, carbon-neutral cooling systems for the 
tournament stadiums, training sites and FIFA Fan Fest with renowned international partners and 
sustainability advisers[,]” but it does not provide any further details or explanation of how those cooling 
systems would work or what they would entail.  Id. at 8. 
 32  See Qatar World Cup Must Be Moved to Winter, Says FIFA Medical Chief, supra note 9. 
 33  Graham Dunbar & John Drayton, Blatter Admits Qatar World Cup ‘Mistake’ After Confirming 
FIFA Always Knew Tournament Would Be Impossible in Summer, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 9, 2013, 
6:45 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2415974/FIFA-President-Sepp-Blatter-
admits-Qatar-2022-World-Cup-mistake.html.  Blatter stated the following: 
Those that have taken the decision at the time, they knew there is problems with the heat. 
They knew it, because it was in the (technical) report . . . It was wrong to say, ‘Now we 
have to play in summer,’ because in summer you cannot play there.  Therefore the 
[Executive Committee] now shall take the decision - and they will take it - that in summer 
you can’t play in Qatar.  
Id. 
 34  See, e.g., Futebol Brazileiro Scores and Fixtures, ESPN FC, http://www.espnfc.us/futebol-
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seems all but certain.35 
This move has caused significant controversy.  There are some that 
support the move36 and more that simply seem to accept its necessity.37  
However, many parties in the footballing community, particularly those in 
Europe, are against the move for a number of practical reasons including, 
most importantly, the interruption to national league seasons in Europe.38 
 
C.  Financial Implications 
 
Professional football is a massive business, especially in Europe.39  
There are many financial interests involved in the professional football 
leagues, including broadcasters40 and individual clubs.41  The World Cup is 
equally significant from a financial perspective because it is one of the 
largest international sporting events in the world.42  As such, countries have 
 
brasileiro/85/scores (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (schedule of 2014 Brazilian league with no dates 
scheduled during the 2014 World Cup, from June 12 through July 13).  While this is a fair point for 
accepting the shift of the tournament, it ignores that not all southern hemisphere leagues are scheduled 
during the summer (e.g., Argentina), as well as the relative burden that the shift would impose.  In both 
numerical scope and financial burden, a move for the European season is far more likely to be 
impactful. 
 35 Press Release, FIFA, Consultation process on the international match calendar 2018-2024 continues 
(Nov. 3, 2014), available at http://fifa.pressfire.net/newsletter/newsletter?id=2686&html=1 ("We are getting 
closer to narrowing the dates for the FIFA World Cup to two options – January/February 2022 or 
November/December 2022."). 
 36  See, e.g., Sepp Blatter: Still Time for 2022 Qatar World Cup Winter Switch, BBC (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/23351824 (“It is high time we recognize that football is a world 
game.  Half the world in the southern hemisphere are effectively forced to play the World Cup in the 
middle of their season, so why is there so much upset in European nations when they are expected to do 
the same?”). 
 37  See, e.g., Isaac Moore, Wenger – Winter World Cup Reasonable, ARSENAL (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.arsenal.com/news/news-archive/wenger-winter-world-cup-reasonable. 
 38  See, e.g., Qatar World Cup: Richard Scudamore Wants Summer Event, BBC (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/23719835. 
 39  Reports on finances from European football leagues found that, despite economic troubles across the 
region, “in 2011/12 the European football market grew to €19.4 billion (up 11%), of which the ‘big five’ 
leagues [the English Premier League in the United Kingdom, the Bundesliga in Germany, La Liga in Spain, 
Serie A in Italy, and Ligue 1 in France] had a market share of 48% (€9.3 billion)[.]”  These leagues are only 
growing more commercial—the 2011–2012 season saw revenues of €2.9 billion in the United Kingdom, up 
16%.  DELOITTE, ANNUAL REVIEW OF FOOTBALL FINANCE 2013 — HIGHLIGHTS 8 (2013), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/deloitteuk/annual-review-of-football-finance-2013.  
 40  Domestic broadcast deals in the United Kingdom are expected to generate £3.4 billion over three 
seasons starting in 2013.  For the 2013–2014 season, it is likely that the money from broadcasting deals 
that will return directly to the clubs will be between £60 million and £95 million.  Id. at 9. 
 41  See David Conn, Premier League Finances: The Full Club-by-club Breakdown and Verdict, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2013, 8:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/football/ 2013/apr/18/premier-
league-finances-club-by-club. 
 42 See, e.g., Peter J. Schwartz, The World’s Top Sports Events, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2010, 12:20 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0315/companies-olympics-superbowl-daytona-worlds-top-sports-
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substantial motivation to win hosting rights to the tournament.43  Because 
of these significant, competing financial considerations, the move of the 
2022 Qatar World Cup from summer to winter could cause many problems 
for professional football and the many businesses involved with it. 
 
1.  Europe 
 
Moving the 2022 Qatar World Cup to winter will have a significant 
effect on European football leagues.  Generally, their season runs from late 
August to mid-May, so it would clearly be disrupted by a November–
December World Cup.  The altered 2022–2023 season would likely begin 
in June and conclude the following June, with a mid-season break for the 
international tournament.44  Effects could include “the impact on players’ 
contracts, some broadcast deals and the knock-on effect on various other 
sports.”45 
National teams are generally comprised of the top professional players 
from each country.  Losing top players due to injuries sustained during the 
tournament would be a likely result, as would fatigue for players who 
participated.  These challenges would make it more difficult for clubs to 
compete successfully.  Because this would have a massive effect on the 
league, it would also likely have an effect on the league’s revenues.46 
The issues affecting the leagues would obviously extend to business 
partners as well.  One important business partner that would be impacted is 
the broadcasting industry—the move from summer to winter would affect 
broadcasters for the English Premier League and for the World Cup.  If the 
2022 Qatar World Cup is moved, English Premier League broadcasters 
could have problems retaining their audience’s interest in the competition 
because of the large gap in the middle of the season.  The 2022 Qatar 
World Cup broadcasters would also struggle, considering, among other 
reasons, that a “summer tournament is more lucrative than a winter 
 
events.html (the 2010 World Cup was surpassed in gross revenue only by the 2008 Summer Olympics 
and the 2010 Super Bowl). 
 43 See, e.g., Simon Chadwick, Hard Evidence: What is the World Cup Worth?, CONVERSATION 
(June 4, 2014, 1:03 AM), http://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-what-is-the-world-cup-worth-
27401 (analysis of expected $3 billion to $14 billion economic impact for the tournament’s host 
countries, as well as an exploration of potential negative effects).  
 44  Qatar World Cup 2022: Pundits Debate Potential Date Swap, BBC (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/24403556. 
 45  Owen Gibson, FIFA Must Consult over Qatar World Cup Switch, Says Richard Scudamore, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/oct/03/fifa-qatar-world-cup-
richard-scudamore. 
 46  Id.  Richard Scudamore, the chief executive of the English Premier League, has stated that it 
would be “morally reprehensible” for FIFA to move the 2022 Qatar World Cup without meaningful 
consultation with professional football leagues because of the effect that the shift would have on these 
leagues.  Id.  “As though because [FIFA has] the power to decide where the World Cup goes, they have 
the power to decide when it’s played.  Those are two very different things. The sporting calendar across 
the world is affected.”  Id. 
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tournament from a telecast point of view,”47 due to the lack of competition 
from other sports broadcasts or the standard network television season. 
 
2.  United States 
 
The impact of the winter move on the sport in the United States would 
not be as drastic as it would be on football in other areas of the world 
because Major League Soccer’s (MLS) season currently runs from March 
to October.48  However, the potential issues for marketing partners in other 
nations would also exist in the United States.  It is likely that, due to the 
competition of other sports at the same time of year, such as American 
football, basketball, and hockey, U.S. broadcasters of the 2022 Qatar World 
Cup would lose significant revenue if the event is moved to the winter 
months.49  Fox Network, which has already paid $425 million for the rights 
to broadcast the 2022 Qatar World Cup, has publicly opposed the winter 
move.50 
Additionally, the United States has an even stronger reason to oppose 
the award of the World Cup to Qatar whether it is moved to winter or not: 
they were the second-place bidders for the hosting rights to the 
tournament.51  Therefore, if the U.S. Soccer Federation (the national 
association for football in the United States) wishes to do so, it may have a 
claim against FIFA for its decision to move the tournament to winter, as 
may the English Premier League or other national football associations.  
But is there a legal avenue for any of these parties to make a claim against 
FIFA’s award of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar and its necessary shift of the 





 47  Siddarth Singh, World Cup 2022 – Controversy Surrounds the Tournament in Qatar, HARD 
TACKLE (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.thehardtackle.com/2013/world-cup-2022-controversy-surrounds-
the-tournament-in-qatar/. 
 48  However, this may change before 2022.  It is possible that Major League Soccer (the MLS) will 
adopt an August–May schedule that is similar to the European football schedule.  If this change occurs, 
the effect on the MLS would be more similar to that on the English Premier League.  Joe Prince-
Wright, Report: MLS Will Adopt European Schedule in 2014 . . . Would August-May Work?, NBC 
SPORTS (Oct. 14, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://prosoccertalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/14/report-mls-will-
adopt-european-schedule-in-2014-would-august-may-work/. 
 49  Tony Manfred, FIFA Might Move the 2022 Qatar World Cup to Winter Because It’s Too Hot, and 
It’s Going to be Be a Total Mess, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/qatar-world-cup-winter-2014-9. 
 50  Tariq Panja, Fox Said to Oppose FIFA Plan to Shift 2022 Soccer World Cup, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
17, 2013, 1:58 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-16/fox-said-to-oppose-fifa-plan-to-
reschedule-2022-soccer-world-cup.html. 
 51  FIFA World Cup Host Announcement Decision, supra note 14. 
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III.  GOVERNING LAWS OF FOOTBALL 
 
To determine the possibility of taking action against FIFA and 
potentially changing the decision to award the tournament to Qatar, move it 
to winter, or both, it is necessary to explore the organizational structure and 
legal governance of FIFA.  Because “[a]rbitration clauses contained in the 
statutes of an association are binding on its members for litigation,” any 
case against FIFA will have to follow the procedures set up by FIFA for 
arbitration and litigation.52  The internal organization of FIFA, the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), and the possibility 
of appeal to Swiss courts are all relevant legal recourses to any potential 
cases against FIFA for its World Cup hosting decision, especially if the 
bribery allegations are legitimate.  In defining the structure of the laws and 
courts governing world football, this part will use the 2012 corruption case 
against former Executive Committee member Mohamed Bin Hammam to 
demonstrate how a case might progress through the system.53 
 
A.  FIFA 
 
1.  Structure of FIFA 
 
FIFA is made up of 209 national associations, which are organized 
into six continental confederations.54  Each national association is 
responsible for all levels of football in the country, from amateur to 
professional clubs and leagues.55  The FIFA Congress, “the legislative body 
of world football,” is made up of one delegate from each national 
association and is responsible for, among other duties, electing the 
president of FIFA, amending the FIFA Statutes, approving financial 
activities, and removing members of the Executive Committee from 
office.56  FIFA is primarily led by the Executive Committee, a group of 
representatives from a variety of geographic regions57 appointed by various 
football confederations and associations.58  The Executive Committee is 
 
 52  CORINA LUCK, ARBITRATION IN FOOTBALL: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED BY FIFA’S 
EXPERIENCES WITH THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORTS 26 (2004). 
 53  Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Arbitral Award (July 19, 2012), available 
at http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Award20262520_FINAL_internet.pdf.  This case was 
selected not only because Bin Hammam is from Qatar, but also because it could be a promising sign for 
future high-level cases against FIFA. 
 54  The Organisation, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/index.html (last visited 
Aug. 6, 2014). 
 55  See, e.g., What The FA Does, THE FA, http://nav.thefa.com/sitecore/content/TheFA/Home/ 
TheFA/WhoWeAre/WhatTheFADoes (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).   
 56  FIFA Congress 2013: All You Need to Know, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/ 
aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/congress/thingstoknow.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 57  Rassel, supra note 11, at 804. 
 58  FIFA Executive Committee, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/ 
executivecommittee.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
YOUD (DO NOT  DELETE)  
The Winter’s Tale of Corruption 
35:167 (2014) 
179 
responsible for, among other things, “decisions on all cases that do not 
come within the responsibility of Congress or are not reserved for other 
bodies by law or under these [FIFA] Statutes.”59  FIFA also contains a 
variety of other committees responsible for different areas of world football 
governance, including marketing and television, finance, legal, and club 
football.60 
FIFA attempts to privately handle any footballing disputes, without 
involving external courts, through its internal bodies that are specifically 
devoted to dispute resolution.61  It has the right to do so because the 
European Council62 has “stresse[d] its support for the independence of 
sports organisations and their right to organise themselves through 
appropriate associative structures” and has recognized that “it is the task of 
sporting organisations to organise and promote their particular sports . . . in 
the way which they think best reflects their objectives.”63  Therefore, 
“FIFA rules require all those subject to its jurisdiction to waive any right to 
take recourse to the courts, and to be bound by decisions of FIFA’s internal 
arbitral-like panel.”64 
There are several different arms of FIFA before which parties can 
bring complaints.  For example,”[t]he Dispute Resolution Chamber, created 
with the revision of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of 
 
 59  FIFA Executive Bodies, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/ 
excoandemergency/index.html.  See also FIFA, FIFA STATUTES (2014) [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES], 
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/AFFederation/Generic/02/41/81/55/FIFAStatuten2014 
_E_Neutral.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).  
 60  Standing Committees, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/standing 
committees/index.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 61  Interview: Omar Ongaro on the FIFA’s Dispute Resolution System, INT’L SPORT LAWYERS 
ASS’N, http://isla-int.com/info/seite/lang/2/artikel/132/Newsletter-130206-DE (last visited Oct. 6, 
2014). 
 62  The European Council is an institution of the European Union (EU) that “defines [its] general 
political direction and priorities.”  The Institution, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/the-institution?lang=en (last visited Aug. 6, 2014) (stating that the European Council 
makes declarations on various issues in the EU). 
 63  Declaration on the Specific Characteristics of Sport and Its Social Function in Europe, of Which 
Account Should Be Taken in Implementing Common Policies, Presidency Conclusions, Nice European 
Council Meeting, (December 7-9, 2000) at Annex IV, #7.  However, the European Council adds that 
these rights must have “due regard for national and Community legislation and [be] on the basis of a 
democratic and transparent method of operation.”  Id. 
 64  2 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND BUSINESS 1461 
(1997) [hereinafter WISE Vol. 2].  FIFA is able to enforce this requirement because their “rules and 
regulations become incorporated in [each] national soccer federation’s rules.”  Id.  See also FIFA, FIFA 
STATUTES § 3, art. 68 (July 2013), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/AFFederation/ 
Generic/02/14/97/88/ FIFAStatuten2013_E_Neutral.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (“The [a]ssociations 
shall insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it is prohibited to take disputes in the 
Association . . . to ordinary courts of law, unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions 
specifically provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of law. Instead of recourse to ordinary 
courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration.”). 
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Players in September 2001, is competent to decide labour disputes between 
clubs and players.”65  However, FIFA has three primary judicial bodies that 
are most likely to hear disputes, especially those regarding a FIFA official: 
the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee, and the Appeals 
Committee.66 
The Disciplinary Committee is “in charge of sanctioning inadmissible 
conduct both on and off the field of play.”67  Under Article 76 of the FIFA 
Disciplinary Code, the Disciplinary Committee “is authorised to sanction 
any breach of FIFA regulations which does not come under the jurisdiction 
of another body.”68  Many of the Disciplinary Committee’s responsibilities 
deal with issues during football matches, such as “sanctioning serious 
infringements which have escaped the match officials’ attention” or  
“rectifying obvious errors in the referee’s disciplinary decisions.”69 
The Ethics Committee is the judicial body of FIFA that is most likely 
to hear issues involving bribery and corruption of FIFA officials.  It is split 
into an investigatory chamber and an adjudicatory chamber.70  The 
adjudicatory chamber may, in addition to its duties involving the Ethics 
Committee’s investigations, “rule on breaches of provisions of the FIFA 
Disciplinary Code which concern morally or ethically incorrect conduct.”71  
The Ethics Committee is specifically charged with preventing any bribery 
or other misconduct committed by the Executive Committee.72  The Ethics 
Committee is also required to be “entirely independent[] and must avoid 
any third-party influence.”73  Any party bound by the FIFA Code of Ethics, 
which includes all FIFA officials and players,74 may file a complaint 
regarding a breach of ethics to the investigatory chamber of the Ethics 
Committee,75 which will then initiate proceedings to potentially 
 
 65  LUCK, supra note 51, at 7. 
 66  FIFA Judicial Bodies, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/judicial 
bodies/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 67  LUCK, supra note 51, at 7. 
 68  FIFA, FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE ch. 1, § 3, art. 76 (2011), available at http://www.fifa.com/ 
mm/document/ affederation/administration/ 50/02/75/discoinhalte.pdf. 
 69  Id. art. 77. 
 70  FIFA, FIFA CODE OF ETHICS pt. III, ch. 1, § 1, art. 26 (2012), http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/ 
affederation/ administration/50/02/82/codeofethics 2012e.pdf. 
 71  Id. art. 29(5).  The Ethics Committee also includes an investigatory chamber that “shall 
investigate potential breaches of [the FIFA Code of Ethics] on its own initiative.”  Id. Art. 28(1).  The 
Ethics Committee may judge “the conduct of all persons bound by [the FIFA Code of Ethics] while 
performing their duties.”  Id. art. 27(2). 
 72  Rassel, supra note 11, at 804. 
 73  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 34. 
 74  Id. pt. 1, art. 2.  There was some dispute in the Bin Hammam case on whether or not, as a 
member of FIFA’s Executive Committee, Bin Hammam was bound by the FIFA Disciplinary Code.  
See Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Arbitral Award, ¶ 103 (July 19, 2012). 
However, any FIFA official is expressly bound by the FIFA Code of Ethics, including members of the 
Executive Committee. 
 75  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 61. 
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recommend to the adjudicatory chamber for examination.76 
The Appeal Committee, another judicial branch, “is responsible for 
deciding appeals against any of the Disciplinary Committee’s decisions that 
FIFA regulations do not declare as final or referable to another body.77  It is 
also responsible for deciding appeals against the Ethics Committee’s 
adjudicatory decisions.78  Decisions by the Appeals Chamber can be 
appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport.79 
These committees and chambers are part of a system that is set up to 
ensure that most disputes arising in the footballing world are resolved 
without external influence.  They are governed by, among other documents, 
the FIFA Code of Ethics and the FIFA Disciplinary Code.80 
The members of these bodies are appointed by the Executive 
Committee.81  The chairman of each committee is required to have “legal 
qualifications,” though those qualifications are unspecified.82  The FIFA 
Disciplinary Code ensures that “the judicial bodies of FIFA pass their 
decisions entirely independently; in particular, they shall not receive 
instructions from any other body.”83  Members of the judicial committees 
are expected to be impartial84 and to keep all matters confidential.85 
Parties to a decision have a right to be heard before any decision is 
passed.86  Any type of proof may be produced in front of the judicial 
bodies,87 and the bodies have “absolute discretion regarding proof.”88  
Parties are entitled to have legal representation in judicial body cases and 
may not be required to appear personally;89 however, they may be obligated 
 
 76  Id. arts. 61–69. 
 77  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 79. 
 78  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 80. 
 79  Id. art. 81(1); see also Part III.B. 
 80  FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 61. 
 81  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 81(1).  This could potentially create a conflict of interest 
if a case was brought against an individual Executive Committee member or the Executive Committee as a 
whole, even though the rules claim that the judicial bodies are independent.  Id. art. 85(1). 
 82  Id. art. 81(5).  The current chairman of the investigatory chamber of the Ethics Committee, 
Michael Garcia, was a partner in the New York office of Kirkland and Ellis LLP.  Mr. Michael J. 
Garcia, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/bodies/01/66/50/29/Michael 
garcia_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).  The chairman of the adjudicatory committee, Hans-
Joachim Eckert, was the presiding judge in the Penal Court of Munich, Germany.  Mr. Hans-
Joachim Eckert, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/bodies/01/66/50/17/ 
hans-joachimeckert_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 83  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 85(1). 
 84  Id. art. 87; FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 35. 
 85  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 36; FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 88. 
 86  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 94. 
 87  Id. art. 96; FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 46. 
 88  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 50; FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, 
art. 97(1). 
 89  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 40; FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 100. 
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to collaborate with the adjudicatory chamber of the Ethics Committee.90  
According to the Disciplinary Code,91 the FIFA Code of Ethics,92 and CAS 
jurisprudence,93 the standard of review of decisions in these bodies is the 
“personal conviction” of the judges.  The burden of proof rests on FIFA in 
cases involving disciplinary infringements94 and on the Ethics Committee 
in cases in front of their adjudicatory body.95  These rules apply to each of 
FIFA’s three judicial bodies. 
 
2.  Bin Hammam Case 
 
Both the Ethics Committee and the Appeals Committee were the first 
groups to make decisions in the Bin Hammam case.  In March 2011, 
Mohamed Bin Hammam, a Qatari member of the Executive Committee, 
announced that he would be running for the position of FIFA president in 
the June 2011 election, thereby making him the only candidate to run 
against incumbent president Sepp Blatter.96  In order to promote his run, 
Bin Hammam set up a meeting with the Caribbean Football Union (CFU) 
on May 10–11, 2011.97 
After Bin Hammam’s speech about his candidacy to the gathered 
officials, he left the room.98  Jack Warner, FIFA’s vice president and the 
president of CONCACAF (the confederation including North America and 
the Caribbean), then announced that there were gifts for the representatives 
from the CFU for each national association.99  Each representative was 
given a brown envelope with $40,000 cash.100  This apparent effort by Bin 
Hammam to bribe the officials to vote for him in the presidential election 
led to an investigation by the Ethics Committee.101  It also led to Bin 
Hammam withdrawing from the presidential election, allowing Blatter to 
win unchallenged.102 
Investigations of the bribery led to the Ethics Committee issuing on 
July 23, 2012 a lifetime ban on Bin Hammam from all football-related 
 
 90  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 41(2). 
 91  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 97(3). 
 92  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 51. 
 93  Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Arbitral Award, ¶ 153 (July 19, 2012). 
 94  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 99. 
 95  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 52. 
 96  Matt Scott, Mohamed Bin Hammam Confirms Intention to Run for FIFA Presidency, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
18, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2011/mar/18/mohamed-bin-hammam-fifa-president. 
 97  Bin Hammam, CAS 2011/A/2625, ¶ 4. 
 98  Id. ¶ 7. 
 99  Id. 
 100  FIFA Exec Bin Hammam Banned for Life for Bribery, CBS NEWS (July 23, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fifa-exec-bin-hammam-banned-for-life-for-bribery/. 
 101  Bin Hammam, CAS 2011/A/2625, ¶13. 
 102  FIFA: Mohamed Bin Hammam of Qatar Ends Presidential Bid, BBC (May 29, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13587449. 
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activity for infringement of the FIFA Code of Ethics.103  Upon appeal to the 
Appeals Committee, the decision was confirmed.104 
The decisions were based on several sections of the FIFA Code of 
Ethics, which were revised in 2012.  Article 3, which relates closely to 
Article 13 in the revised code, stated in part that “Officials shall show 
commitment to an ethical attitude while performing their duties . . . [and] 
may not abuse their position as part of their function in any way, especially 
to take advantage of their function for private aims or gains.”105  Article 9 
discussed loyalty and confidentiality to FIFA and various associations, 
Article 10 laid out rules for accepting and giving gifts, and Article 11 
forbade bribery.106  Upon this basis, the Ethics Committee upheld a lifetime 
ban on any participation by Bin Hammam in football-related activities.107  
After the Appeals Committee upheld the decision, Bin Hammam took his 
appeal to the next possible level for a football-related case: the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport.108 
 
B.  Court of Arbitration for Sport 
 
1.  Structure of CAS 
 
If a dispute cannot be resolved within the ranks of FIFA, or if a party 
wishes to appeal a decision made by one of the FIFA tribunals, the case 
will go to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).109  CAS, originally part 
of the International Olympic Committee but now independent from that 
organization, was formed as “an independent authority in international 
sports-related matters that could deal and pronounce binding decisions to 
settle possible litigation.”110  This independence is crucial, as it led the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal to recognize the court as a “true court of arbitration, 
maintaining that the awards were being pronounced by independent 
arbitrators and that their decisions could be categorized as arbitral 
 
 103  Ethics Committee Bans Football Officials, FIFA.COM (July 23, 2011), http://www.fifa.com/ 
aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid=1479068/index.html. 
 104  Appeal Committee Confirms Ethics Committee Decision on Bin Hammam, FIFA.COM (Sept. 15 2011), 
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid=1511253/.  While neither the Ethics 
Committee nor the Appeals Committee publish their decisions, the transcript of each decision was published in 
the CAS appeal, and a media release was published by FIFA after each decision.  Id.; FIFA Exec Bin 
Hammam Banned for Life for Bribery, supra note 100; see also Bin Hammam, ¶¶ 21, 23. 
 105  Id. ¶ 109. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Appeal Committee Confirms Ethics Committee Decision on Bin Hammam, FIFA.COM (Sept. 15 
2011), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid=1511253/. 
 108  FIFA Rejects Mohamed Bin Hammam’s Appeal Against Football Ban for Life, GUARDIAN (Sept. 
15, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2011/sep/15/fifa-reject-mohamed-bin-hammam-appeal. 
 109  LUCK, supra note 51, at 1. 
 110  Id. at 2. 
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CAS is divided into two divisions, the Ordinary Arbitration Division 
and the Appeals Arbitration Division.112  The Ordinary Arbitration Division 
deals with first-instance cases heard at the CAS, which are primarily 
commercial disputes (e.g., contract, broadcasting, and licensing 
disputes).113  The Appeals Arbitration Division is responsible for 
“resolv[ing] disputes concerning the decisions of federations, associations 
or other sports-related bodies insofar as the statutes or regulations of the 
said sports-related bodies or a specific agreement so provide.”114  This 
division is where FIFA cases are primarily heard because the cases are 
almost always heard within FIFA’s internal bodies before moving to 
CAS.115  To file an appeal, all legal remedies at lower levels must be 
exhausted, including internal remedies within FIFA.116 
FIFA accepted CAS jurisdiction for appellate cases in the early 2000s, 
and now football cases make up a significant portion of the CAS 
caseload.117  Once a party has sought all possible relief from the appropriate 
governing body of FIFA, they can submit a statement of appeal and an 
appellate brief to CAS.118  An arbitrator will then decide whether to uphold 
the decision or vacate and replace the decision.119  These decisions are 
binding on the parties.120  Swiss law is most often the law applied in CAS 
arbitration,121 although the panel will first attempt to apply any set of rules 
the parties have agreed upon including the laws and regulations of FIFA.122 
CAS arbitration occurs in front of a panel of three arbitrators.  When a 
dispute is submitted to CAS, the court offers the parties a list of potential 
arbitrators of various nationalities.  The parties choose one arbitrator each 
and a third arbitrator together; this third arbitrator will act as the president 
 
 111  Id. 
 112  COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, STATUTES OF THE BODIES WORKING FOR THE SETTLEMENT 
OF SPORTS-RELATED DISPUTES art. S20(a) (2010) [hereinafter CAS STATUTES], available at 
http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Code20201220_en_2001.01.pdf.  The Ordinary 
Arbitration division “constitutes [p]anels, whose responsibility is to resolve disputes submitted to the 
ordinary procedure, and performs . . . all other functions in relation to the efficient running of the 
proceedings” and deals with cases not involving sports bodies.  Id. 
 113  Louise Reilly, An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) & the Role of 
National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 63, 64 (2012). 
 114  CAS STATUTES, supra note 111, art. S20(b). 
 115  FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 64. 
 116  CAS STATUTES, supra note 111, art. R47. 
 117  Rassel, supra note 11, at 809. 
 118  FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 64. 
 119  Rassel, supra note 11, at 810. 
 120  This is true in most cases; however, “CAS decisions are only enforceable in nations that have 
signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,” 
which includes all countries that bid on the 2018 or 2022 World Cup.  Id. at 811. 
 121  1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND BUSINESS 676 
(1997) [hereinafter WISE Vol. 1]. 
 122  CAS STATUTES, supra note 111, art. R45. 
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of the panel of arbitrators before which the parties will dispute their case.123  
These arbitrators have agreed to both objectivity124 and confidentiality.125 
The standard of review for CAS cases, as confirmed in the Bin 
Hammam case, is “comfortable satisfaction.”126  CAS has specified that, 
“in practical terms, [the] standard of proof of personal conviction [used by 
FIFA in their judicial bodies] coincides with the ‘‘comfortable 
‘satisfaction’ standard [used by CAS]” and clarified that “[i]t is a standard 
that is higher than the civil standard of ‘balance of probability’ but lower 
than the criminal standard of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’”127 
 
2.  Bin Hammam Case 
 
When Mohamed Bin Hammam received his decision from the 
Appeals Committee, he filed a statement of appeal with CAS to attempt to 
reverse the decision and his lifetime ban.128  His appeal had a number of 
procedural and substantive claims.129  It alleged, among other procedural 
claims, that he did not receive proper due process,130 that FIFA’s internal 
processes against him were not impartial,131 and that he was not properly 
informed of the charges brought against him.132  Substantively, he claimed 
that FIFA relied on blatantly unreliable witnesses in making its decision,133 
lacked proper evidence,134 and used improper evidence135 in making its 
determination against him.  Regarding any procedural unfairness involving 
due process or impartiality, CAS determined that the very fact of an appeal 
to CAS remedied previous grievances.136  Therefore, the panel determined 
 
 123  WISE Vol. 1, supra note 120, 675–76.  Additionally, “[i]f the parties desire there to be only one 
arbitrator, they appoint him or her by mutual agreement.” Id. 
 124  CAS STATUTES, supra note 111, art. S18. 
 125  Id. art. S19. 
 126  Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, Arbitral Award, ¶ 153 (July 19, 2012). 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. ¶ 25. 
 129  Id. ¶¶ 37, 142. 
 130  Id. ¶ 81. 
 131  Id. ¶ 87. 
 132  Id. ¶ 93. 
 133  Id. ¶ 95.  Many of the parties who were witnesses in the case were also charged with corruption.  
Jack Warner, who was deeply involved in the situation and whose statements were used against Bin 
Hammam, resigned from football when FIFA began investigations into his alleged ethical breaches.  
Because he resigned willingly, “all Ethics Committee procedures against him [were] closed and the 
presumption of innocence is maintained.”  FIFA Vice-President Jack A. Warner Resigns, FIFA.COM 
(June 20, 2011), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid=1455834/. 
 134  Bin Hammam, CAS 2011/A/2625, ¶ 106. 
 135  Id. ¶ 99. 
 136  Id. ¶ 129 (“[A]n appeal to the CAS arbitration procedure cures any infringement of a due process right 
that may have been committed by a sanctioning sports organization during its internal disciplinary 
proceedings.”).  “[T]he [p]anel concludes that any possible procedural violation that may have occurred in the 
YOUD (DO NOT  DELETE)  
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 35:167 (2014) 
 
186 
the case on substantive issues. 
CAS focused its determination on the charge of bribery.  The panel 
specified that to satisfy a charge of bribery the accusers must prove four 
elements:  
 
(i) The person committing the act of bribery must be a FIFA 
official;  
(ii)  a gift or other inducement must have been offered;  
(iii) the act must be addressed to a third party; and 
(iv) the purpose of the act must be to gain an advantage for the 
person offering the bribe or for some third person.137   
 
To fulfill these elements and to attempt to link the cash gifts to Bin 
Hammam, the panel went through the statements of various witnesses.138 
After determining that several of the witness statements that FIFA used in ruling 
against Bin Hammam lacked consistency and credibility,139 the panel decided that 
there was insufficient evidence to link Bin Hammam to the alleged bribes to the 
point of comfortable satisfaction.140  The panel was careful to note that “it [was] 
not making any sort of affirmative finding of innocence in relation to Mr. Bin 
Hammam”141 and repeatedly noted that Bin Hammam was likely the source of the 
money at issue.142  The panel articulated concern about FIFA’s handling of the 
investigation143 and expressly left the matter open to further proceedings if new 
evidence was discovered.144  Until these new proceedings against Bin Hammam 
 
course of the proceedings before the FIFA Ethics and Appeal Committees has been cured.”  Id. ¶ 138. 
 137  Id. ¶ 145. 
 138  Id. ¶¶ 172, 177–84. 
 139  Id. ¶ 158.  One of the witnesses whose testimony held the least weight, Jack Warner, resigned 
from football before his corruption cases could move forward.  The panel noted that Warner “appears to 
be prone to an economy with the truth.”  Id. ¶ 161. 
 140  “If Mr. Warner and his statements are taken out of the equation, the record of evidence in 
relation to the [r]espondent’s case on the origins of the suitcase and the monies it contained is founded 
on extremely limited sources, to put the point generously.”  Id. ¶ 169.  “[T]he majority of the [p]anel 
[has] certain doubts as to the weight of the evidence on which the charges against Mr. Bin Hammam are 
founded.”  Id. ¶ 190.  “[T]he majority of the [p]anel is unable to conclude to its comfortable satisfaction 
that the charges against Mr. Bin Hammam are established.” Id. ¶ 203. 
 141  Id. ¶ 204. 
 142  Id. ¶¶ 195, 204 (“[T]his conclusion should not be taken to diminish the significance of its finding 
that it is more likely than not that Mr. Bin Hammam was the source of the monies.”). 
 143  “It is readily apparent that the investigation carried out by FIFA was neither thorough in respect 
of the matters that it did address, nor comprehensive in its scope.  Of great concern to the [p]anel is the 
decision by FIFA to terminate the investigation of Mr. Warner when he resigned from FIFA.”  Id. 
¶ 201.  “By closing the Ethics Committee procedures, FIFA disabled itself from pursuing a proper, 
thorough and complete investigation of Mr. Bin Hammam’s role in the matters that give rise to these 
proceedings. In effect, the paucity of the evidence is connected to FIFA’s own actions and inactions.”   
Id. ¶ 202. 
 144  Id. ¶ 208. 
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were taken by FIFA, however, CAS annulled FIFA’s decision against him and 
reversed his lifetime ban on football-related activities.145 
 
C.  Swiss Federal Tribunal 
 
If a party wishes to appeal a CAS decision, its options are limited.  
FIFA and the CAS are both governed by the laws of Switzerland, the home 
of each organization’s headquarters.146  Therefore, in some circumstances 
CAS awards may be challenged in front of the Swiss Federal Tribunal.147  
However, these circumstances are limited.148  If a case comes before a 
Swiss court, it is important to note that Switzerland does not have a specific 
sports law statute, as can be found in other nations like France, Spain, and 
Italy; therefore, “[w]hen sports matters come before the Swiss courts for 
decision, they apply their existing laws, principles, etc., to resolve them.”149 
The case against Bin Hammam did not reach the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal.  After his initial success in CAS, FIFA brought another 
corruption case against Bin Hammam regarding other allegations of 
conflicts of interest,150 which he lost at both the internal level and at the 
CAS level.151  Bin Hammam did not appeal to Swiss courts the October 
2012 decision of CAS, which refused to overturn his temporary ban on 
football-related activities.152  In December of 2012, Bin Hammam resigned 
from all football-related activities and was banned for life by FIFA from 
any future activities related to organized football.153 
 
 145  Id. ¶ 207; see also Mohamed Bin Hammam Wins Appeal Against FIFA Ban, BBC (July 19, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/18901316. 
 146  Switzerland is also the location of the head of UEFA, as well as other international sports 
federations outside of football.  For that reason, Swiss law is an increasingly important facet of 
international sports law.  WISE Vol. 2, supra note 63, at 1412.  Therefore, counsel for CAS cases 
“should in preparation for the CAS arbitration, research not only CAS arbitration rules and prior CAS 
rulings, but also Swiss law on several issues (substantive law, treaties, arbitration law, conflict of law 
rules, etc.).”  Id. at 1413; see also FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 66; CAS STATUTES, supra note 
111, art. R45. 
 147  Reilly, supra note 112, at 75. 
 148  20 Questions About the CAS, TAS / CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-231-
1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 149  WISE Vol. 2, supra note 63, at 1414. 
 150  These “conflicts of interest” were not specified.  Mohamed Bin Hammam Resigns from Football, 
Banned for Life, FIFA.COM (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/ 
newsid=1973422/; FIFA Issues New Life Ban to Ex-co Member Mohamed Bin Hammam, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter FIFA Issues New Life Ban], http://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/ 
dec/17/fifa-life-ban-mohamed-bin-hammam. 
 151  Agence France-Presse, Court of Arbitration for Sport Turns Down Mohamed Bin Hammam’s 
Appeal, NDTV SPORTS (Oct. 31, 2012), http://sports.ndtv.com/football/news/198688-court-of-
arbitration-for-sport-turns-down-mohamed-bin-hammams-appeal. 
 152  FIFA Ban Mohamed Bin Hammam for Life After He Quits Football, BBC (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/20762363. 
 153  FIFA Issues New Life Ban, supra note 149. 
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As demonstrated by the Bin Hammam case, a party has the following 
three options if it wants to challenge the decision to move the 2022 Qatar 
World Cup to winter, or FIFA’s original decision to award the tournament 
to Qatar: the internal tribunals of FIFA, the CAS, or the Swiss courts.154  
The remainder of this Comment explores what a hypothetical case against 
FIFA would look like and what the result would likely be given past case 
law, current regulations, and general sports law. 
 
IV.  PURSUING A CASE 
 
The remainder of this Comment creates and discusses a hypothetical 
case against FIFA that a party could bring regarding the shift of the 2022 
Qatar World Cup tournament to winter, given the structure of FIFA and the 
previously discussed remedies available to allegedly aggrieved parties.  
There are two distinct issues that could provide sufficient cause for a 
complaint.  First, the case could be based on the shifting of the tournament 
to winter, the ensuing implications to professional leagues whose schedules 
would be disrupted by the shift, and the financial detriment to professional 
football leagues, clubs, broadcasters, and other business partners.  Second, 
the case could be based on FIFA’s original decision to award the 
tournament to Qatar and the surrounding allegations of bribery, corruption, 
and political collusion by FIFA officials during the voting process. 
The best party to pursue a case against FIFA for the decision to award 
the 2022 World Cup to Qatar is one of the national associations that is a 
direct member of FIFA, as opposed to a football league or club that is an 
indirect member and thus has less power.155  The U.S. Soccer Federation or 
the American Football Association would both be appropriate parties.156  
 
 154  The Swiss courts would be a court of last resort in this case.  They have previously ruled in 
Cañas v. ATP Tour that parties participating in sports organizations “whose rules provide for recourse 
to arbitration will not have any choice but to accept the arbitral clause.”  Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Mar. 22, 2007, 133 ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE [ATF] III 235 (Switz.), 
translated in 1 SWISS INT’L ARB. L. REP. 65, 84–85 (cited in Matthew J. Mitten, Judicial Review of 
Olympic and International Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 51, 53 (2009)).  This lack of options is why the Swiss courts have the right to review decisions 
made after CAS appeals from those organizations.  Id. 
 155  “Within FIFA, it is only the football associations that are members of the football governing 
body.  However, there are other persons and entities who do not have membership but who can be 
directly affected by the decisions of FIFA, given that they belong to ‘sub-associations’ within the 
structure of football.  This is the case with leagues, clubs, players, and licensed match and players’ 
agents, which are regarded as ‘indirect’ members.  For this reason, it is considered that they have the 
legitimacy to contest the decisions of FIFA that directly affect them, in the same manner that this is 
possible for the actual members.”  LUCK, supra note 51, at 9–10. 
 156  The Football Association is the national association of England.  FA, supra note 54.  The FA is 
just one of many European associations that would be an appropriate party.  The FA’s failed bid for the 
2018 World Cup for England, which created some bitterness, could be potential motivation for the case.  
See, e.g., Joe Prince-Wright, Did FIFA Intentionally Derail England’s 2018 World Cup Bid?, NBC 
SPORTS (Oct. 2, 2013), http://prosoccertalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/02/did-fifa-intentionally-derail-
englands-2018-world-cup-bid/. 
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An individual league or club would also be potential parties, as they would 
have a financial stake in the decision to move the 2022 Qatar World Cup to 
winter.  As direct or indirect members of FIFA, any of these parties could 
have standing to bring either complaint to the internal FIFA judicial bodies 
to begin a case against FIFA.157 
 
A.  FIFA 
 
The first venue to take a case involving football would be FIFA itself 
through either of these judicial bodies: the Disciplinary Committee or the 
Ethics Committee.158  However, the FIFA Statutes dictate that both of these 
judicial bodies are only qualified to sanction certain parties.159  Neither 
judicial body has the power to sanction the Executive Committee, the FIFA 
body responsible for voting on the location of the World Cup.160  The 
judicial bodies may be able to sanction individual officials on the Executive 
Committee for misconduct, but they seemingly cannot take action against 
the committee as a whole for awarding the tournament to Qatar. 
Even if either the Disciplinary Committee or the Ethics Committee 
reprimanded the members of the Executive Committee who were involved 
in politically motivated collusion161 during the vote, it does not necessarily 
mean that the vote would be reversed or retaken.  The Disciplinary Code 
does allow for “return of awards” as a sanction,162 but it is not clear 
whether granting tournament hosting rights is considered an award.  Nor is 
it likely that Qatar could lose the award of hosting rights due to the 
misconduct of the officials of either the Executive Committee or the Qatar 
Football Association.  One reason is that the Ethics Committee has already 
 
 157  Given the weight of power in FIFA and the lack of precedent, it may be unlikely for any case to 
be brought against FIFA, especially if the party bringing the case takes the standard route of first 
bringing the case to FIFA’s internal bodies.  However, the extreme public opinion against FIFA on the 
matter could lead to some action being taken.  It is enough of a possibility that Qatari officials are 
preparing for legal action to prevent a re-vote.  Richard Farley, BBC Reports Qatari Officials 
Considering Legal Action Over Potential 2022 Re-vote, NBC SPORTS (June 5, 2014), 
http://prosoccertalk.nbcsports.com/2014/06/05/bbc-reports-qatari-officials-considering-legal-action-
over-potential-2022-re-vote/. 
 158  The Ethics Committee, as the party with the specific responsibility to reprimand the Executive 
Committee for breaches of conduct, would likely be the more appropriate choice, although both seem 
like possible options.  See Rassel, supra note 11, at 805. 
 159  FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 62(2) (“The Disciplinary Committee may pronounce the 
sanctions described in these [s]tatutes and the FIFA Disciplinary Code on [m]embers, [c]lubs, 
[o]fficials, [p]layers and match and players’ agents.”).  Id. art. 63(2) (“The Ethics Committee may 
pronounce the sanctions described in these [s]tatutes, the FIFA Code of Ethics and the FIFA 
Disciplinary Code on [o]fficials, [p]layers and match and players’ agents.”). 
 160  Id. art. 63(2). 
 161  See, e.g., Pelso, supra note 21; World Cup – Blatter Blames France, Germany for Qatar Choice, 
supra note 11. 
 162  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, arts. 10, 16. 
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admitted that it has no power to remove the hosting rights from Qatar 
regardless of its findings on ethical breaches of conduct.163  The third 
judicial body of FIFA, the Appeal Committee, can only review decisions 
by the Disciplinary Committee or the Ethics Committee, and even then it is 
limited to decisions “that are not declared final by the relevant FIFA 
regulations.”164  The most likely place for the case to be heard would be the 
Ethics Committee because it has power over Executive Committee 
officials, and a successful case would likely rest on the grounds of breach 
of ethics by individual officials. 
A case brought in front of FIFA to remove the 2022 World Cup from 
Qatar could claim corruption by any number of members of the Executive 
Committee during the decision-making process leading up to the vote for 
the hosting rights for the 2018–2022 tournaments.165  As mentioned in 
Part II of this Comment, the alleged actions of the Executive Committee 
members may have been in breach of the following articles of the FIFA 
Code of Ethics: Article 13 (general rules of conduct),166 Article 14 (duty of 
neutrality),167 Article 19 (conflicts of interest),168 and Article 21 (bribery 
and corruption).169  If a party brought these issues to the investigatory 
chamber of the Ethics Committee, that chamber would decide whether to 
file a report against the individuals involved.  If so, the case could move to 
the adjudicatory chamber of the Ethics Committee.170 
Because any kind of proof is admissible to the Ethics Committee,171 
parties could bring any of the evidence or witnesses used in the media’s 
widespread allegations of corruption and bribery.  The adjudicatory 
chamber will have “absolute discretion” regarding proof and will be held to 
 
 163  FIFA’s Ethics Committee Has ‘No Power’ to Remove World Cup 2022 from Qatar Even If 
Bribes Took Place, supra note 27. 
 164  FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 64(2). 
 165  This could include Michel Platini who may have been inappropriately convinced to vote for 
Qatar by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.  Lichfield, supra note 18. 
 166  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 13(3) (“Persons bound by this [c]ode shall show 
commitment to an ethical attitude. They shall behave in a dignified manner and act with complete 
credibility and integrity.”). 
 167  Id. art. 14 (“In dealings with government institutions, national and international organisations, 
associations and groupings, persons bound by this [c]ode shall, in addition to observing the basic rules 
of art. 13, remain politically neutral, in accordance with the principles and objectives of FIFA, the 
confederations, associations, leagues and clubs, and generally act in a manner compatible with their 
function and integrity.”). 
 168  Id. art. 19(2) (“Persons bound by this [c]ode shall avoid any situation that could lead to conflicts 
of interest. Conflicts of interest arise if persons bound by this [c]ode have, or appear to have, private or 
personal interests that detract from their ability to perform their duties with integrity in an independent 
and purposeful manner.”). 
 169  Id. art. 21(1) (“Persons bound by this [c]ode must not offer, promise, give or accept any personal 
or undue pecuniary or other advantage in order to obtain or retain business or any other improper 
advantage to or from anyone within or outside FIFA.”). 
 170  Id. arts. 61, 69. 
 171  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 96; FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 46. 
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its standard of proof of personal conviction.172  The chamber will decide on 
the basis of the file created by the investigatory chamber of the Ethics 
Committee,173 unless one of the parties specifically requests a hearing to 
give an oral statement.174  A statute of limitations will not be a problem as 
bribery and corruption cases are not subject to a limitation period.175  There 
have been successful cases of corruption against Executive Committee 
members in the Ethics Committee (e.g., the Bin Hammam case).176  Thus, 
precedent exists for high-ranking members of FIFA to be found guilty of 
corruption. 
However, even if the adjudicatory chamber agrees to hear the case and 
determines on the basis of the evidence that one or more members of the 
Executive Committee acted against the FIFA Code of Ethics in the process 
of voting for the 2022 Qatar World Cup, the issue remains that the internal 
mechanisms of FIFA currently have no apparent power to reverse the vote 
or remove hosting rights from Qatar.  The Ethics Committee has the power 
to pronounce sanctions,177 which are listed in Article 6 of the FIFA Code of 
Ethics as the following: “warning; reprimand; fine; return of awards; match 
suspension; ban from dressing rooms and/or substitutes’ bench; ban on 
entering a stadium; ban on taking part in any football-related activity; [or] 
social work.”178  The only possible sanction that could be interpreted as the 
ability to revoke hosting rights in Qatar would be “return of awards,” but 
this seems unlikely because “awards” seems to refer to awards within the 
context of the game of football (i.e., trophies or money) and not the award 
of something as intangible as tournament hosting rights.179  Even if the 
Ethics Committee finds severe breaches of the ethical code by members of 
the Executive Committee in awarding the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, it 
 
172  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 67, art. 97. 
 173  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 74(1). 
 174  Id. art. 74(2). 
 175  Id. art. 12(2). 
 176  This example of success may be mitigated by the fact that Bin Hammam was running against 
Sepp Blatter in the FIFA presidential election.  His public corruption case, subsequent withdrawal from 
the running, and later permanent ban from football has been suggested by many to be less of a result of 
FIFA’s dedication to ethical behavior than it is a result of Blatter’s interest in maintaining power.  See, 
e.g., Martin Samuel, What a Sack of Weasels! Trust No One in This Tawdry Tale of Deceit, DAILY 
MAIL ONLINE (May 27, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-
1391376/FIFA-corruption-Sepp-Blatter-Mohamed-Bin-Hammam—trust-one.html; Martyn Ziegler, 
Mohamed Bin Hammam Claims FIFA President Sepp Blatter Is Untouchable, INDEP. (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/mohamed-bin-hammam-claims-fifa-
president-sepp-blatter-is-untouchable-8213612.html. 
 177  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 5. 
 178  Id. art. 6. 
 179  The only explanation of the meaning of an “award” in FIFA’s official documents is in the 
Disciplinary Code: “The person required to return an award shall return the benefits received, in 
particular sums of money and symbolic objects (medal, trophy, etc.).”  FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, 
supra note 67, art. 16. 
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seems that the Ethics Committee will be powerless to do anything other 
than sanction the offending parties. 
Given the lack of power in these judicial bodies to take any 
meaningful action against the Executive Committee’s decision, any attempt 
to bring a case against FIFA would likely prove unsuccessful.  However, it 
may be a necessary first step to allow for the case to be seen at a higher 
level, such as CAS or the Swiss Federal Tribunal courts. 
 
B.  Court of Arbitration for Sport 
 
The next step would be CAS, if CAS decides that it is able to take the 
case.  If the parties begin with an attempt to bring a case before one of 
FIFA’s judicial bodies and subsequently have a decision issued against 
them, then CAS should have jurisdiction.  In a prior CAS case brought by 
the national football association of Iran, CAS confirmed that FIFA has 
standing to be sued in some cases.180  Therefore, it is possible for a party to 
sue FIFA directly. 
CAS has ruled that there are three baseline requirements for it to be 
able to arbitrate a case: a decision of a sports federation, agreement for 
CAS jurisdiction, and exhaustion of internal legal remedies.181  As the 
FIFA Statutes allow for CAS jurisdiction, the second requirement is met.182  
If the previously discussed case had been taken to FIFA’s judicial bodies, 
the third requirement would also be met.  Therefore, the only remaining 
determination by CAS to ensure its ability to take the case would be to 
show that the case was based on an official decision made by a party of 
FIFA. 
While a decision of FIFA’s judicial bodies against Executive 
Committee members may be used to meet this appealable decision 
requirement, the case would be faced with the same challenge of lack of 
 
 180  Football Federation Islamic Republic of Iran (IRIFF) v. FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1708, ¶ 41 (Nov. 4, 
2009) (“In the case CAS 2007/A/1329 & 1330, also quoted in case CAS 2008/A/1517, the [p]anel ruled 
that ‘(u)nder Swiss law, applicable pursuant to Articles 60.2 of the FIFA Statutes and R58 of the CAS 
Code, the defending party has standing to be sued (légitimation passive) if it personally obliged by the 
‘disputed right’ at stake (see CAS 2006/A/1206).  In other words, a party has standing to be sued and 
may thus be summoned before the CAS only if it has some stake in the dispute because something is 
sought against it (cf. CAS 2006/A/1189; CAS 2006/A/1192.’”).  In this case, FIFA had no standing to be 
sued because there was insufficient relation between the case at hand and FIFA; any legal remedies 
would have involved two other parties.  CAS upheld the general principle that FIFA would have 
standing to be sued if there was sufficient connection between FIFA and the subject matter.  Id. ¶ 48. 
 181  Id. ¶1. 
 182  FIFA STATUTES, supra note 58, art. 66(1) (“FIFA recognises the independent Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes between 
FIFA, [m]embers, [c]onfederations, [l]eagues, [c]lubs, [p]layers, [o]fficials and licensed match agents 
and players’ agents.”).  All national associations under FIFA must recognize the jurisdiction of CAS as 
well.  Id. art. 68(1) (“The [c]onfederations, [m]embers and [l]eagues shall agree to recognise CAS as an 
independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members, affiliated [p]layers and [o]fficials 
comply with the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to licensed match and 
players’ agents.”). 
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remedy as it was at the internal level.  If the case is based on the allegations 
of bribery of FIFA officials in making the decision to award hosting rights 
to Qatar, the case will have to consider the precedent in the Bin Hammam 
case.  If the panel can determine to its comfortable satisfaction that (1) the 
FIFA officials of the Executive Committee (2) offered gifts or inducements 
(3) to third parties (4) to gain an advantage in the process of awarding the 
hosting rights to Qatar, it could rule that improper bribery occurred.  While 
the Bin Hammam case dealt with offering bribes, rather than accepting 
them (as would likely be primarily the case here, given the allegations), the 
FIFA Code of Ethics includes accepting bribes in the bribery and 
corruption prohibition.183  Even if CAS finds that Executive Committee 
officials were guilty of bribery and corruption, remedies would likely be 
against them personally rather than against FIFA or the decision to allow 
Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup.184 
 The party’s only real hope would be to appeal Qatar’s right to host the 
World Cup directly or the right of FIFA to move the tournament dates, 
instead of simply punishing Executive Committee members involved in 
bribery in the voting process.  Therefore, the party must make an argument 
that the Executive Committee’s vote granting Qatar hosting rights counts as 
a decision that is appealable by CAS.185  No precedent exists for this kind 
of decision against a vote by the Executive Committee,186 but it is possible 
that the level of corruption alleged against the Executive Committee as a 
whole could lead to CAS accepting the case on these terms.  If CAS 
accepts a case against FIFA or the Executive Committee as a whole, the 
arbitration panel “may issue a new decision which replaces the decision 
challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous 
instance.”187  
In a case between football clubs AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague, 
and UEFA, the European football confederation, CAS discussed which 
parties might bring a claim against sports federations and whether the 
decisions of those federations are completely independent or not.188  The 
 
 183  FIFA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 69, art. 21(1). 
 184  Samuel Morris, Comment, FIFA World Cup 2022: Why the United States Cannot Successfully 
Challenge FIFA Awarding the Cup to Qatar and How the Qatar Controversy Shows FIFA Needs 
Large-Scale Changes, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 541, 554 (2012). 
 185  CAS has previously noted that “FIFA’s Statutes and regulations contain no general definition of 
what must be considered a ‘final’ decision.”  Aris FC v. FIFA, CAS 2007/A/1251, ¶ 8 (July 27, 2007).  
This ambiguity could be used in favor of a party arguing that an award of a World Cup is an appealable 
decision. 
 186  Morris, supra note 183, at 554. 
 187  CAS STATUTES, supra note 109, art. R57.  The arbitration panel “has full power to review the 
facts and the law.”  Id. 
188 AEK Athens (Greece) and SK Slavia Prague (Czech Republic) v. Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA), CAS 98/200, ¶ 50 (Aug. 20, 1999) (“Article 75 CC provides that a resolution 
taken by an organ of an association which contravenes the law or the association statutes can be 
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court mentioned that some decisions would be subject to laws outside of 
the sports realm and some would not.  It determined the following: 
 
A sporting rule should pass the following tests in order not to be 
caught by EC law: (a) it must concern a question of sporting 
interest having nothing to do with economic activity, (b) it must 
be justified on non-economic grounds, (c) it must be related to 
the particular nature or context of certain competitions, and (d) it 
must remain limited to its proper objective.189 
 
Considering this statement, it seems that higher scrutiny will be placed 
on decisions of sports federations if those decisions affect matters beyond 
the sports realm.  Given the financial nature of hosting a World Cup 
tournament,190 it would be difficult to argue that the award was made 
purely from a sporting standpoint.  The financial aspects of the World Cup 
hosting award would therefore make a case more likely to succeed if it is 
based on the financial implications of the decision to move the tournament 
to winter. 
The AEK Athens arbitration panel also discussed the importance of 
integrity and ethical decision making in sports.  The panel asserted that “the 
notion of integrity as applied to football requires something more than mere 
honesty and uprightness, both from a sporting and from a business point of 
view.”191  The panel also emphasized the importance of public perception 
of the integrity of the game: 
 
[F]ootball must preserve its great strength in business terms: the 
enormous hold which individual clubs have over the loyalty of 
their supporters.  This makes the game attractive to advertisers, 
sponsors, television and so on.  Maintaining that loyalty is not 
being sentimental; being responsive to spectator concerns is 
simply good business.  That means, amongst other things, being 
 
judicially challenged by any member of the association who has not approved it.”).  The panel also 
noted that “a sports-governing organization such as an international federation must comply with 
certain basic principles of procedural fairness vis-à-vis the clubs or the athletes, even if clubs and 
athletes are not members of the international federation.”  Id. ¶ 61. 
 189  Id. ¶ 82. 
 190  As one of the largest international sporting events in the world, the tournament has serious 
financial implications, especially in industries such as infrastructure development, tourism, and 
hospitality.  Singh, supra note 46. 
 191  AEK Athens, CAS 98/200, ¶ 25.  The panel supported this claim by noting the following: 
Several witnesses have stated that the highest standards are needed for the integrity of the 
game (Mr. Taylor), that the integrity of sports is crucial to the sports consumer 
(Professor Weiler), and that «football can only continue to be successful if it is run 
according to the highest standards of conduct and integrity, both on and off the field» 
(Sir John Smith).   
Id. ¶ 23. 
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able to reassure supporters that the game is straight.192 
 
This concern over public perception of the integrity of the game would 
surely work in favor of an aggrieved party.  The perception of FIFA has 
been vastly negative due to the Qatar decision and the bribery scandal 
surrounding it, as well as other unrelated instances of bribery in FIFA.193  If 
the panel were to determine to its comfortable satisfaction that the 
Executive Committee made an appealable decision based on non-sporting 
matters, it may rule that the vote for Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup or 
the decision to move the tournament to winter violates the FIFA Code of 
Ethics. 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that a vote of the Executive Committee 
may not be appealable to CAS, and even if it is, there is no current remedy 
to change an Executive Committee decision.  CAS may have the power to 
punish individuals involved in bribery, but there is currently no remedy that 
allows a vote to be retaken.194  CAS may therefore be unwilling to force 
FIFA to award the hosting rights to another nation, and if this is the case, 
the move to winter may be inevitable given the seeming impossibility of 
hosting the tournament in the summer. 
 
C.  Swiss Federal Tribunal 
 
The final resort of a party wishing to sue FIFA would be a Swiss 
court, which might be the judicial body least likely to hear the case because 
of the general unlikelihood of the Swiss courts overturning any decision 
made by CAS.195  However, if a Swiss court accepts the case, it is more 
likely that the decision will sway in the party’s favor, particularly in a case 
regarding the shift to a winter tournament because that would be a decision 
with effects outside of the realm of the game. 
Swiss courts may also be the most likely to forego the requirement of 
exhaustion of internal remedies at FIFA—”[a]rguably, where the governing 
body’s internal appeal organs do not fulfill the requisites of a genuine, 
impartial panel meeting due process requirements regarding its 
composition, procedure, etc., or where exhaustion would be inequitable or 
futile, exhaustion of internal governing body remedies is not required by 
 
 192  Id. ¶ 27. 
 193  See Dorsey, supra note 20. 
 194  Morris, supra note 183, at 554. 
 195  Id. at 559–60 (“The SFT will vacate an arbitration award only if the CAS panel was ‘constituted 
irregularly, erroneously held that it did or did not have jurisdiction, ruled on matters beyond the 
submitted claims, or failed to rule on a claim,’ or if ‘the parties are not treated equally by the CAS 
panel, if a party’s right to be heard is not respected, or if the award is incompatible with Swiss public 
policy.’”).  See also Mitten, supra note 153. 
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Swiss courts.”196  A party may be able to argue that pursuing a decision 
against the Executive Committee of FIFA in FIFA’s judicial bodies would 
be futile. 
The major consideration in allowing sports cases to be heard in Swiss 
courts is whether the decision that is being appealed was made on the basis 
of “game rules (Spielregel)” or “legal rules (Rechtsregel).”197  Swiss courts 
will only consider cases based on legal rules; they consider game rules 
outside of their jurisdiction.  A game rule has been described as “any 
disadvantage or penalty imposed which directly relates to the game or 
competition in course and does not extend beyond the competition or 
game.”198 
Due to sports federations’ right to autonomy, Swiss courts will refrain 
from regulating the affairs of the governing body if it followed its own 
rules, “but for other, sometimes over-weighing principles.”199  These 
outweighing principles tend to be those of fairness—“Swiss courts have 
held that when the personal civil rights of someone are violated by a sports 
governing body, they will come to their aid – civil rights protection will 
prevail.”200  These personal civil rights can, in some cases, be attached to 
legal persons,201 which would include national associations or other parties 
that might bring the case against FIFA.  The party could assert that, in 
awarding the tournament to Qatar and shifting it to the winter months, 
FIFA would violate the rights of professional leagues to freely pursue their 
economic endeavors or chosen line of work.202  If the parties can 
convincingly make the argument that a winter shift prevents the 
professional leagues and the players therein from freely pursuing their 
work, they may be able to succeed at the Swiss courts.  However, 
considering the extreme infrequency of sports law cases in this 





 196  WISE Vol. 2, supra note 63, at 1420. 
 197  Id. at 1415.  “A growing number of legal writers have criticized [the game rules/legal rules] 
approach, most critics preferring to abandon it and apply a balancing test between the individual 
interests of an athlete, team, etc. [o]n the one hand, and the overall interests of the sports organization, 
on the other.  That, in fact, is what the Swiss courts do anyway, except that in the process, they 
generally also utilize [the game rules/legal rules] approach in their analysis.”  Id. at 1419. 
 198  Id. at 1416. 
 199  Id. at 1417. 
 200  Id. 
 201  See, e.g., WISE Vol. 2, supra note 63, at 1445 (discussing the S.A. Olympique de Marseilles v. 
UEFA case). 
 202  WISE Vol. 2, supra note 63, at 1418. 
 203  This will be especially unlikely if the case has already gone through the FIFA and CAS courts.  
As of 2009, the Swiss Courts have never overturned a CAS decision on the merits of the case, although 
they have left open the option to do so if the decision goes against Swiss public policy.  Mitten, supra 
note 153, at 58. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the potential damage to professional leagues and their 
financial partners, it is likely that the hosting rights to the 2022 World Cup 
will remain with Qatar and the tournament will take place in the winter of 
that year unless (1) the Executive Committee decides otherwise very soon, 
which it has repeatedly asserted that it will not do,204 or (2) successful legal 
action can be brought against the Executive Committee’s decision 
(unlikely).  While this will cause significant problems in the footballing 
and sports business community, there are insufficient legal remedies inside 




 204  See, e.g., Blatter Reaffirms 2022 World Cup Will Remain in Qatar, LONDON S.E. (Feb. 19, 2014, 10:18 
AM), http://www.lse.co.uk/AllNews.asp?code=wj1is4nr&headline=Blatter_reaffirms_2022_World_Cup_will 
_remain_in_Qatar; World Cup ‘Will Stay in Qatar’, FOX SOCCER (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://msn.foxsports.com/foxsoccer/worldcup/story/fifa-spokesman-says-2022-world-cup-will-stay-in-qatar-
100313. 
